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Abstract
This article aims to clarify the case and the mechanism where sanction or pun-
ishment by institution can deliver the evolution of cooperation. Compared to peer
sanctioning, institutional sanctioning may be sensitive to players’ attitude toward
players who do not pre-commit punishment. Departed from former studies based on
the punisher who always acts cooperatively, we assume that the punishing player is
skeptical in that she cooperates in proportion to how many same types join in her
team. Relying on stochastic adaptive dynamics, we show that institutional sanction-
ing coupled with skeptical punisher can make cooperation evolve for the case where
peer sanctioning may not.
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1 Introduction
In theory and practice, sanctioning misbehaviors is core and integrated part in delivering
the evolution of cooperation. If defectors are not restricted, they are to increase, which
ultimately leads to the demise of cooperation. In preventing defectors from thriving, the
role of punishers is considered to be critical, who take their own sacrifice to sanction
defectors. However, punishing players tend to be evolutionarily inferior to defectors since
the punishing is hard to outperform the punished. For this reason, many studies based on
evolutionary game theory and its dynamics has been developed to illustrate how punishers
can survive despite its evolutionary disadvantage, and make cooperation evolve in a society.
This paper touches another aspect of sanctioning, which is not treated frequently in
related theories. When we observe some kind of defectors in societal entities, what are our
reactions to them? Some may just pass them over, and some may punish them directly;
scold them or put some sort of physical actions on them. Another way to punish defection
is resorting to some institution such as police or higher ranks that make defection down
as a representative of the general good, which we obey. Most of theoretical researches on
punishment has conventionally assumed peer sanctioning where players punish defectors
directly, which leaves the intriguing issues of institutional sanctioning intact. Based on
the methodology of stochastic evolutionary dynamics, this article explores when and how
such institutional sanctioning makes cooperation evolve in simple theoretical setting. Our
main argument consists of two parts:
1) Commitment problem is important when institutional sanctioning is applied. If pre-
commitment is possible by paying ex ante some cost of sanctioning, commitment can
be done credibly. The public information on commitment level may affect the strategic
choice for players, especially punishers who already pay their bill. We show that
skepticism of punishers would play a crucial role in making cooperation in a team
when it is coupled with institutional sanctioning. This skepticism equips player with
the ability to defend itself from unconditional defection and/or to exploit unconditional
cooperation. Although our skepticism may not be directly translated into selfishness,
the behavior of our skeptical punisher is partly considered to be selfish. In this sense,
our model implies that players’ selfishness does not always disturb the evolution of
cooperation.
2) In contrast to former studies where sufficient intensity of punishment is assumed for
peer sanctioning, our model works well for less intense range of punishment. This
implies that the solution by institution can be complementary to that by direct types
such as peer punishment. Considering many real-world circumstances that direct and
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harsh punishment cannot be readily implemented, institutional sanction may fit for
this case.
The organization of the paper is following. Section 2 reviews former studies related
to our argument. Section 3 elaborates the setup of the model. Section 4 provides two
logics of evolutionary process that show when and how institutional sanctioning can be
effective. Section 5 summarizes the gist of the paper, and makes some comments on future
researching agendas.
2 Related Studies
The first research that inspired this paper is the evolution of cooperation “via freedom
to coercion.” Based on stochastic evolutionary dynamics, Hauert et al. (2007) show that
evolutionary dilemma on the origin and the stability of punishment can be solved when
lone interaction is introduced. The loner exits her team, and gets a fixed payoff unrelated
to others’ strategic choice. This loner fixates defectors, and all of the loner are fixated
again by the cooperators and the (cooperative) punishers. This evolutionary history ends
up with prevailing cooperative state. We would suggest another route for the evolution of
cooperation, which works without introducing such lone interaction.
The second is the paradoxical role of “selfish” punishment in the evolution of coopera-
tion, which is disposed to punish other defectors even though she acts defectively. Eldakar
et al. (2007) and Eldakar and Wilson (2008) assume that strategic choice can be separated
from the act of punishment, and show that selfish act can make the evolution of coopera-
tion. Instead of pure selfishness postulated in these studies, we introduce the skepticism
that makes players choose their strategy in a team based on the information of punishing
commitment.
The last one is the peculiarity that institutional sanctioning has compared to peer
sanctioning (Yamagishi, 1986; Gu¨rerk et al., 2006; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Sigmund et al.,
2010). Unlike most of studies that presume peer sanctioning, we introduce institutional
sanction that punishment is done via some authority over individual players. With peer
sanctioning, the cost of sanctioning can change according to the size of defectors in a team,
which may make pre-commitment of sanctioning unbinding. Institutional sanctioning can
be credibly committed by paying some costs ex ante before the choice of strategy. Sigmund
et al. (2010) shows that institution may deliver the evolution of cooperation when second-
order punishment is to be tackled. By assuming players’ utilization of information of
commitment, our research investigates more basic and elementary aspect of institutional
sanctioning, which makes cooperation evolve in a straight way.
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3 Setups for Sanction by Institution
Public good game with committing stage
Our basic framework is a simple game, (linear) public good game (PGG) of G ≥ 3 size.
We consider a well-mixed population of constant size M  G, and G individuals are
randomly selected and offered the option to participate in PGG. Each can contribute for
the public good or not; cooperate (C) or defect (D). For simplicity, players invest a fixed
amount 1 normalized. The contributions of xC cooperators in a team are multiplied by
r > 2, and then divided among all G participants. The payoff for each C and D is given
by

r
xC
G
for D
r
xC
G
− 1 for C.
To integrate commitment on punishment in our model, the game proceeds on three
stages at each team level.
1) Committing stage: Players can pay γ to establish an sanctioning institution. If a
player pays this cost, she can pre-commit to agree sanctioning defective players. All
the participants in a team know this information.
2) Contributing stage: Players participate in PGG described above, and obtain their
payoff.
3) Sanctioning stage: Finally, sanctioning mechanism works to punish defective players.
Sanctioning technology is implemented in such way that each defector is equally pun-
ished by sanctioning institution established in first stage. Net after sanction is the final
payoff for each player.
Skepticism of punisher
The punishing players (P ) in former studies tend to be naive, who acts cooperatively and
punishes others when she observes defectors in her team. We call her cooperative punisher
(CP ). For them, committing stage is redundant, for they cooperate anyway regardless of
information on commitment.
In comparison to CP , we propose a more skeptical type of punisher who chooses her
strategy based on information from committing stage. We call her skeptical punisher
(SP ), who cooperates in proportion to the level of commitment in her team (Rustagi
et al., 2010). Although other players’ strategies in her team are not known to her, the
information known to SP in a team indicates the intensity of punishment against defection
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in sanctioning stage. When the punishment is weak, defection can be beneficial for a player
since she can exploit unconditional cooperators or defend herself best against unconditional
defectors. In sum, SP is the punisher who is sensitive to the information on commitment
in choosing her strategy.
Sanctioning mechanism
The credibility of commitment depends on sanctioning mechanism. To make commitment
credible, institutional sanction is to be introduced, which is that each punisher in a team
pays a fixed amount to form a local institution to police her team. This institution is
used to punish defectors in sanctioning stage. The collected total for punishment in a
team, γ xP , is the total cost of punishment, βxP /xD is imposed on each defector where
β > γ is sanctioning technology, and xD and xP are numbers of D and P in a team
respectively. The γ xP is lost for nothing if there be no defectors in a team. On this
account, institutional sanctioning can incur social cost when a team consists only of SP .
Payoffs
With institutional sanctioning, payoffs Vi for i ∈ {C,D, P} have four parts; benefits from
cooperation in a team that are equally shared, investment in PGG when the player chooses
cooperation, sanction that is inflicted by peer or institution, and cost of sanction incurred
if she make commitment for sanctioning institution. After normalizing investment as 1,
payoffs of institutional sanctioning with CP are given by
VC (xC , xD , xP ) := r
xC + xP
G
− 1
VD(xC , xD , xP ) := r
xC + xP
G
− β xP
xD
VP (xC , xD , xP ) := r
xC + xP
G
− 1− γ,
(1)
where r is the beneficiary multiplier for PGG. Total population consists of each ni for
i ∈ {C,D, P} with nC + nD + nP = M .1
In the case of SP , the probability that SP cooperates is assumed to be simply δP (xP ) :=
x
P
−1
G−1 , which is that SP minds the level of commitment by others in her team to choose
her strategy. Payoffs of institutional sanctioning with SP are given by
1For peer sanctioning, VD := r
x
C
+x
P
G
− β xP , VP := r
x
C
+x
P
G
− 1− γ xD .
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VC (xC , xD , xP ) := r
xC + δP xP
G
− 1
VD(xC , xD , xP ) := r
xC + δP xP
G
− β xP
xD + (1− δP )xP
VP (xC , xD , xP ) := r
xC + δP xP
G
− δP · 1− (1− δP )β
xP
xD + (1− δP )xP
− γ.
(2)
4 Stochastic Imitation Dynamics
This section discusses two versions of stochastic dynamics where imitation is used as social
learning for players. The one is designed for intuitive and analytic purpose; the other is
implemented for more general and precise validation of our argument. As is mentioned,
only three types, C, D and P are to be cast in our scenario. The loner who plays a critical
role in Hauert et al. (2007) is excluded on purpose to illustrate an alternative route to
cooperation without the bypass such as lone interaction.
Simple Imitation Dynamics
When all of players are composed of one type, this state is absorbing in that imitation or
adaptive dynamics would make no change. Namely, each player cannot learn from others
in population. We propose a simple imitative dynamics that is heuristic for investigating
evolutionary dynamics for our discussion. Particularly, this dynamics is nice to be handled
since sampling complication of more generalized processes such as Moran process can be
simplified without losing its implications. At first, we put three assumptions to model our
simple adaptive process.
1) Adiabatic stochastic process: When mutation or innovation is introduced, each state
can be overturned by these invaders or remain unchanged by the disappearance of
them. Resident players who watch invading type are quick to change their strategy
if the payoff of invaders is better than theirs. If the resident is better than mutants
in payoff, imitation makes mutants disappear. Assuming that such innovations are
extremely rare, imitation works much faster than innovation. That is, next mutation
always happens after learning process ends up to a homogeneous state. This process
can be called “adiabatic” since a newly introduced mutation ends up with extinction
of this type or with its fixation. These processes can be nicely described by a simple
Markov chain with the same number of states of possible players’ types (Taylor et al.,
2004; Fudenberg and Imhof, 2006; Sigmund, 2010).
2) Multiple mutants: Instead of assuming a single invader, we propose that multiple
mutants of a type is introduced in a homogeneous state. First, single mutant is not
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proper to consider more general and complex evolutionary process like Moran process.
In Moran process, a mutant that is worse than the resident may not be immediately
extinct in the sampling process. This can be partly modeled by approving multiple
mutants of a type. Next, mutant type can spring in a group instead of single one if
a single mutant has some degree of extra influence over other residents. The size of
mutation by type k is denoted by µk ≥ 2 for k ∈ {C,D, P}. 1 ≤ µk ≤ G is assumed,
which is that the size of mutation is not too massive.
3) Simultaneous imitation by a universal model: When homogeneous state is perturbed
by the group of a mutant type, our simple imitation process works. After a session
of interaction ends, each imitates a universal model who is chosen by its payoff. The
choice of the model is based on the size of payoff. If there exists a tie among some
of players, one among them are randomly chosen. If there exists a tie among all of
players, imitation follows neutral drift where imitation is done by a randomly chosen
model.
Simple Markov transition matrix can be obtained for three stationary states, which can
be used in calculating invariant distribution among three states. This transition matrix
is given by

1− φ
DC
− φ
PC
φ
CD
φ
CP
φ
DC
1− φ
CD
− φ
PD
φ
DP
φ
PC
φ
PD
1− φ
CP
− φ
DP
,

where φij denotes the fixation probability that the absorbing state that consists all of i
(all-i state) is overturned to all-j state by invading type j for i, j ∈ {C,D, P}. Fixation
probabilities can be determined in a very simple way. φij is given by multiplying the
probability of µi random mutations and the transition probability by imitation when
mutation rate goes to zero (Fudenberg and Imhof, 2006). When the population stay
a homogeneous state, this can be perturbed by one type of µi-sized mutants. As is
mentioned, after mutants spring, two types of players compare the payoff of their own
with that of the other. For our simple imitation dynamics, each fixation probability is
given by
φij :=

(pm)
µi · 1 if piij (µi ,M − µi) > piji(µi ,M − µi)
(pm)
µi · 0 if piij (µi ,M − µi) < piji(µi ,M − µi)
(pm)
µi · µi
M
if piij (µi ,M − µi) = piji(µi ,M − µi),
(3)
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where piij is the expected payoff of i against j when µi-sized i, (M − µi)-sized j with all
other types extinct for i, j ∈ {C,D, P}, and pm is the probability that a mutant chooses
the type i among set of types.2 For the interaction among C, D and P , pm is given by 1/2
where a mutant randomly choose one from alternatives in a homogeneous state. Third
case of (3) follows the neutral drift where the transition probability by µi/M .
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For the class of irreducible transition matrix, invariant distribution among three states
can be uniquely given by the eigenvector of the largest eigenvalue, 1, in our case (Fudenberg
and Imhof, 2006). Irreducible transition matrices for this case, however, are not suitable
to investigate our problem analytically because the burden of calculation is hard to be
handled. Thus, we investigate an extreme case of reducible transition matrix, where the
full cooperation is realized. Following lemma shows those cases.
Lemma 1. Assuming 2 < r < G, the fully cooperative state where D disappears is realized
if and only if
φCD = 0 (i.e., φDC > 0), φCP = 0, φDP = 0, φPD > 0.
Lemma 1 tells that the full cooperation can be realized only in P -all state if 2 < r < G.4
The absorbing state of P cannot be overturned by invasion of C and D, and P can fixate
D-all state. For the case of r > G that the team is excessively productive, the evolution
of cooperation may not be serious issue because C can fixate D-all state. As a matter of
fact, there is no need to introduce P for this case. This is why we restrict our attention
to the case of 2 < r < G. Following proposition shows that the evolution of cooperation
is not delivered when CP is introduced with sanctioning institution.
Proposition 1. For the interaction among C, D and P , sanction by institution coupled
with CP cannot deliver the fully cooperative state.5
As is the case of CP with sanction by peer (Hauert et al., 2007), sanctioning institution
cannot make evolution of cooperation for the interaction among C, D and P . Intuitively,
CP with sanctioning by institution is always invaded by C because benefits between two
types are same but P has already paid set-up fee for sanctioning institution. Hence
piCP (µC ) > piPC (µC ).
Corollary 1.1. Institutional sanctioning with CP cannot make the evolution of coopera-
tion when the loner (L) is introduced.
2Appendix B describes the exact definition of piij .
3For the case of neutral drift, a mutant enjoys a same payoff with the resident. This mutant can fixate
the population when she is randomly chosen for the model to imitate, which happens by the probability
of µi/M .
4The proof is in Appendix A.
5The proof is in Appendix B.
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The proof of Corollary 1.1 is trivial. Brandt et al. (2006) shows that L makes evolu-
tionary cycle when it is introduced to the interaction between C and D. The interaction
among C, D, L and P makes the evolution of cooperation only if C cannot fixate P . For
peer sanctioning C and P enjoy the same payoff, which makes neutral drift between two.
But, as institutional sanctioning with CP makes C fixate P , the cyclical dynamics among
C, D, L and P emerges, which is similar to the interaction among C, D and L.
The result so far implies that institutional sanctioning cannot make its way when P
does not utilize information of committing stage. So to speak, CP casted in most of evo-
lutionary studies cannot validate our sanctioning institution. Proposition 1 is intriguingly
modified when SP who takes advantage of the information comes in.
Proposition 2. Let us assume that finite M  G. The fully cooperative state can be
delivered by institutional sanction with suspicious punisher (SP ) if 1) 2 mutants are in-
troduced, and 2) the intensity and the cost of punishment are smaller than the properly
given.6
Proposition 2 shows that sanctioning institution works nicely when it is coupled with
SP . At first, the first condition in the proposition illustrates that invading of SP into D-all
state can be done with two mutants springing. Imagine that a single SP is introduced in
D-all state. As there is no contribution, SP always defects, and payoffs from contributing
stage between SP and D are same. However, as SP pays the setup cost of institution,
piPD(µP = 1) < piDP (µP = 1). When two mutants exist in total population, the chance
that those two are teamed up in a same group can open the door for SP to invade into
D-all state.
The second is intriguing since it indicates the condition of β and γ, the effectiveness and
the cost of punishment, where institutional sanction works well. Former studies show that
peer sanction with exit option can deliver the evolution of cooperation if the punishment
is sufficiently effective, and the cost of it is affordable. This is to prevent D from fixating
P -all state, which can be done only when punishment is sufficiently effective. Our result
shows that institutional sanctioning coupled with SP loses its power when punishment
is too harsh. Heuristically, SP is not unconditional cooperator but opportunistic in the
sense that she would take advantage of non-committers. It is noted that institutional
sanction is also applied to her if she acts defectively. Too effective punishment may harm
SP seriously, which can hinder SP from thriving in population.
We can tell that increasing µ would make more favorable condition for the fully coop-
erative state, which is that the proper range of β and γ expands. Following proposition
shows more general results by multiple mutants, µ ≥ 2.
6The proof is in Appendix C.
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Proposition 3. Let us assume that finite M  G. The fully cooperative state can be
delivered by institutional sanction with suspicious punisher (SP ) if 1) µ ≥ 2 mutants are
introduced, and 2) the intensity and the cost of punishment are smaller than the properly
given.7
Corollary 3.1. The range for β and γ for the fully cooperative state 1) increases as µ
gets larger, and 2) decrease as M gets larger.8
The second part of Corollary 3.1 implies that our institutional sanctioning works only
when M is not too large. This is interesting compared to the case of peer sanctioning with
four types, C, D, L and CP . For any proper β and γ, according to our simple dynamics,
the frequency of cooperative state is given simply by 4µ+M7µ+M , which converges to 1 as M
get larger.9
As is mentioned, µ-sized mutants of SP should successfully infiltrate or at least make
neutral drift to the homogeneous state of D when the fully cooperative state is realized.
This relies on the sampling odd that more than one SP are selected in a team, which
decreases as M grows. If the institution cannot adjust its working on β and γ, well-
operated sanctioning institution can turn to be obsolete when the size of total population
increases. Limiting case of M → ∞, institutional sanctioning cannot be helpful in the
evolution of full cooperation for arbitrarily given β and γ.
Moran Process
Now, we would extend previous results of institutional sanction with SP to more general
and complex adaptive process. This would show that former simple imitation dynamics
can gain wider applicability for the cases where analytic approach cannot be approved.
The Moran process is a natural way to go in studying stochastic evolutionary dynam-
ics. Moran process is a classical model of population dynamics, which is developed in
population genetics, and has been imported to game theory recently. In every time step
an individual is randomly chosen for reproduction by its fitness, and makes a single clone
that replace a randomly selected other member. The sampling for imitation based on
payoffs is continued until the population ends up with a homogeneous state.10 Fixation
probabilities under Moran process are given by
7The Proof is in Appendix D.
8The RHS of the proof in Appendix D directly proves this corollary.
9Detail derivation is in Appendix E
10See Fudenberg et al. (2004) for detail theoretical exposition on Moran Process.
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φij =
1
M−1∑
k=0
k∏
m=1
1− s+ spiji(m)
1− s+ spiij (m)
, (4)
where piij (m) is the expected payoff of i type with j type when the population consists
of m-sized i type and (M −m)-sized j type where i, j ∈ {C,D, P}.11 In Moran process,
payoffs are adjusted by s to prevent them from turning negative where 1 is the baseline
payoff, and s is the intensity of selection, which cannot be higher than 1/(1−minpiij ). As
all of fixation probabilities are positive, transition matrix is irreducible, which means that
any state of i can be reached by starting j 6= i.12 We make cases of invariant distribution
under standard Moran process by parameters properly given.13
Claim 1. For Moran process, institutional sanction with suspicious punisher can make
the evolution of cooperation for the low intensity and the low cost of punishment properly
given.
β
γ
COP
(a) Evolution of cooperation
γ
β
(b) Contour plot
Figure 1: The evolution of cooperation by institutional sanctioning with SP for Moran
process. Values are obtained by standard Moran process, and parameters are M = 100,
G = 5, r = 3 and s = 0.3. A computer program generates values by 0.01 step for β and γ.
COP is the sum of frequency where population stays in C and P . (a) shows the range of
β and γ that makes fully cooperative state. For starker area, φPD ≥ 1/M . (b) draws the
contour map, and the gray scale represents the frequency of cooperative state from black
(COP = 0) to white (COP = 1). The scale of β and γ is adjusted for visualization.
Figure 1 exemplifies Claim 1. For small β and γ properly given, the evolution of
cooperation is realized by institutional sanctioning coupled with SP . For starker area in
11See Appendix B for exact formulation for piij (m). Consult Traulsen and Hauert (2008) for the friendly
derivation of (4).
12Transition matrix is trivially aperiodic and recurrent, thus invariant distribution exists.
13Calculating modules are written by MATHEMATICA 8.0 of Wolfram, Inc.
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(a) of Figure 1 where φPD ≥ 1/M , the speed of fixation from D to SP is fast enough. This
ensures stability of cooperative state. Intriguingly, former results by our simple imitation
dynamics fairly resemble those by the Moran process that has more general and complex
formulation for players’ imitation process.
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(c) β = 0.3
Figure 2: The increase of s on the frequency of each type for standard Moran process.
Parameters are r = 3, γ = 0.05, G = 5, M = 100, and Maximum s is 0.705. As β
increases, the level of s that unravel the cooperative state decreases.
The intensity of selection, s, also affects working of institutional sanction. Figure 2
illustrates that the effect of s on the frequency of cooperative state changes its direction
by some s.
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β = 0.2
β = 0.3
β = 0.4
Figure 3: The increase of M on the frequency of cooperation. Parameters are r = 3,
γ = 0.05, s = 0.3 and G = 5. When M is larger than a certain level, institutional
sanctioning cannot deliver the evolution of cooperation. Moran process makes similar
condition to former simple imitation dynamics for β and γ to diliver the evolution of
cooperation.
Corollary 3.1 shows that the size of M has negative effect on the frequency of cooper-
ative state for given β and γ. Moran process for institutional sanctioning replicates this
result. Figure 3 illustrates that the increase of M unravels cooperative state. For given β
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and γ, as the size of M increases, the frequency that the population stays in cooperative
state drops abruptly at a certain level of M . This implies that, for Moran process, our
institutional sanctioning works effectively within certain level of M .
5 Concluding Remarks
We’ve examined the evolution of cooperation in the context of how punishment is done.
Considering that most of punishments tend to involve institution, our study fills the gap
in researches, which assumes conventional peer sanctioning. Main lessons of this paper
are as follows.
1) Institution can be justified when the efficacy and the cost of sanctioning both are not
too large when they are compared with those of sanctioning by peer. This is reasonable
result considering that real-world institution and its sanctioning details.
2) The work of institution depends on players’ skepticism that watch carefully signals from
commitment to determine their strategies. Our implication is similar to the insight
that is provided by studies of tag-based evolution Riolo et al. (2001). Ours, however,
makes more sense economically than tag-based evolution since issue of institution and
commitment is explicitly integrated.
Sanctioning by institution can provide one of key aspects that the study on the evolu-
tion of cooperation should explore. This paper suggests one simple route that institutional
sanctioning affects the evolutionary process among different types of players and the evo-
lution of cooperation. Actually, the theoretical setting of this paper is so heuristic that
other interesting problems that institutions can embrace are omitted from the considera-
tion. Further studies on many details of institution may enrich the research of evolutionary
game theory and its dynamics on the evolution of cooperation.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
It is easy to show that φDC > 0 and φCD = 0 are satisfied when 0 < r < G. With this, other
fixation probabilities are to be determined that reducible transition matrix ends up with
the full cooperative state. Generally, invariant distribution of reducible transition matrix
depends on initial condition, but we can find the condition for the fully cooperative state.
φPD > 0 and φDP = 0 should hold to prevent D from appearing in invariant distribution,
and φCP = 0 hold to prevent the cyclic movement among C, D and P . 
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Appendix B Proof of Proposition 1
When µ mutants springs in M -sized population, they can be grouped as PGG teams in
different ways. This process can be calculated by considering hyper-geometric function.
Let us denote that µk = µ = 2 for k ∈ {C,D, P}. Expected payoff of a representative
type i against type j that is sampled in G-sized PGG groups are given by
piij (µi) =
G−1∑
ni=0
(
µ−1
ni
)(
M−µ
G−ni−1
)(
M−1
G−1
) Vi(ni) = µ−1∑
ni=0
(
µ−1
ni
)(
M−µ
G−ni−1
)(
M−1
G−1
) Vi(ni)
piji(µi) =
G−1∑
nj=0
(
M−µ−1
nj
)(
µ
G−nj−1
)
(
M−1
G−1
) Vj (nj ) = G−1∑
nj=G−µ−1
(
M−µ−1
nj
)(
µ
G−nj−1
)
(
M−1
G−1
) Vj (nj ),
where Vi(ni) := V (ni + 1, G− ni − 1, nk = 0), ni is the number of type i excluding type-i
one considered, the number of type j is G− ni − 1, and the number of k 6= i, j type, nk ,
is 0 for i, j ∈ {C,D, P}.
The proposition can be easily proved by showing that the first part of the lemma
cannot be satisfied. It is sufficient to show that φCP = 0 cannot hold. As is assumed, P is
CP . The payoff of invading µ-sized C against resident P and that of resident P against
invading C are given by
piCP (µc) = r + 1
piPC (µc) = r + 1− γ.
When γ > 0, piCP (µC ) > piPC (µC ) for any positive µC . Thus, all the resident P turn
into C by imitation. Fixation probability of C in P -all state, φCP , is given by (1/2)
µ · 1.
φCP is always positive, which violates Lemma 1. 
Appendix C Proof of Proposition 2
We check the first conditions of Lemma 1. For φCD = 0, some calculation can show that
piCD(µC ) − piDC (µC ) is given by r(M−G)G(M−1) − 1, which is negative for r < G. Thus, this
condition is easily satisfied for any positive µC . Other three conditions of the first line of
Lemma 1 are simplifed and arranged by condition of β and γ. All of three conditions are
linear with respect to r, and are given by
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piPD(µP )− piDP (µP ) = A1 +B1 r
piCP (µC )− piPC (µC ) = A2 +B2 r
piDP (µD)− piPD(µD) = A3 +B3 r
(C.1)
It is easy to show that B1 > 0, B2 < 0, and B3 < 0. To sufficiently satisfy other three
conditions in the lemma,
0 ≤ −A1
B1
(≡ rp) ≤ r (C.2)
A2
B2
<
A1
B1
(C.3)
A3
B3
<
A1
B1
. (C.4)
(C.2) is that r is to be properly defined if P can fixate D. (C.3) and (C.4) mean that
any of C and D cannot fixate P for r > rp . With tedious arithmetics, these conditions
boil down to
γ +
(
(G+ 1)M2 −G(G+ 5)M + 2G(G+ 1)
G(G+ 1)(M − 2)(M − 1)
)
β ≤ M − 2G+ 2
M2 − 3M + 2 , (C.5)
where 2 < r < G for G  M , and (C.5) defines the proper range for β and γ in the
proposition. 
Appendix D Proof of Proposition 3
The technique to prove this proposition is identical to Proposition 2, but the calculation
cannot be done for general µ. For our purpose, it is sufficient to show that the institutional
sanctioning works with SP for some proper β and γ. Our strategy to prove is following.
If institutional sanctioning with SP works for less punishment upon D and more upon P ,
it still works for the case in the proposition. The less and more system can be expressed
neatly. We replace VD and VP in (2) with
VD(xC , xD , xP ) := r
xC + δp
G
− β xP
G
VP (xC , xD , xP ) := r
xC + δp
G
− δp · 1− β(1− δp) G
xD
− γ.
(D.1)
The punishment term for D in (D.1) is smaller than that in (2), that for P is larger.
If sanctioning works with less effective punishment, this must also hold for more effective
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punishment. Thus, the range of β and γ with (D.1) to realize the full cooperation is a
sufficient condition for that with (2). The actual proof proceeds similarly on Appendix C,
and the condition for β and γ with µ is given by
γ +
(
G
G− 1 −
G(G− 1)µ
G(M − 1)
)
β ≤ (M − 2G+ 2)(µ− 1)
(M − 2)(M − 1) , (D.2)
where 2 < r < G for GM . 
Appendix E Frequency of Cooperative State with Peer
Sanctioning Applied among C, D, L and CP
For interactions among C, D, L and CP , the sufficient level of cooperative state can be
made when following fixations are realized: 1) D fixates C, 2) L fixates D, 3) C and CP
fixates L, and 4) C and CP are drifted neutrally, and any other fixating relations are not
possible for proper case of the evolution of cooperation.
The first is given by 2 < r < G. The second is easily justified when the payoff of
exit option is higher than 0 that is the payoff of D-homogeneous state. The third can be
understood when the payoff of full cooperative state is higher than that of exit option.
The last one merits discussion. In the evolutionary dynamics of “via freedom to coercion”,
the population stays sufficiently long at cooperative state. This can be ensured by neutral
drift between C and CP . This drift is successfully defended from D, for P still works
in the population. When population is fixated by C, D can prospers, but which state is
quickly taken over by L again. When above four fixating relations are satisfied, µ-sized
imitation dynamics makes the transition matrix which is given by

1− ( 13)µ − ( 13)µ µM 0 ( 13)µ ( 13)µ µM(
1
3
)µ
1− ( 13)µ 0 0
0
(
1
3
)µ
1− 2 ( 13)µ 0(
1
3
)µ µ
M 0
(
1
3
)µ
1− ( 13)µ µM

.
This matrix is irreducible, and its unique invariant distribution is given by the nor-
malized eigenvector of eigenvalue 1. The frequency of cooperative state yields 4µ+M7µ+M .
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